The previous text contains only four articles; It is this short text that is the legal agreement, but it contains the latter agreement in its timetables.  Technically, this proposed agreement can be distinguished as a multi-party agreement, unlike the Belfast Agreement itself.  20 All this shows some important features of the ongoing Irish border conundrum. First, it is not just an economic and commercial problem, but a highly political and constitutional one. A purely economic and technical solution to the economic dimension of the problem is, by its very nature, irrelevant. The second conclusion that can be drawn from this study is that the current problem at the Irish border is not a new issue, which would only be a consequence of the June 2016 Brexit referendum. Although the decision taken by a majority of voters in the United Kingdom destabilizes the current regime of the soft Irish border on the island of Ireland, the main causes of the difficulties encountered with the Irish border lie in the weaknesses of the GFA itself. If there is a problem today with the Irish border, it is mainly because the GFA has not provided real and long-term political solutions to the historic dispute over the very status of the Irish division limit set between 1920 and 1925. The Brexit referendum itself is a sign that the Irish and British states have not yet defined the precise and agreed constitutional conditions of their common sovereignty over Northern Ireland.
If so, the decision to hold the 2016 referendum, confirmed by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, shows that, in accordance with the British Constitution, the London Executive rightly regarded Northern Ireland as an integral part of British territory and not as an area of common sovereignty with Dublin. Despite the GFA, the British Constitution remains a strictly unionist constitution. With regard to Northern Ireland`s internal institutions, the situation following the Brexit referendum showed that despite an inter-communal majority of 56% for remains and despite a common interest in maintaining an open border, both communities still maintain their ancestral denominational views across the border. Power-sharing democracy, established in Northern Ireland in 1998, institutionalized ethnoterritorial antagonism and clearly failed to change ethno-local identities in Northern Ireland. 14 Therefore, the GFA, as a common and reciprocal redefinition of British and Irish public sovereignty over Northern Ireland, was a remarkably incomplete and unfinished constitutional process. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its border problem in Ireland show that the 1998 agreement did not go far enough to provide for an explicit, indisputable and constitutional (new) definition of the Dublin and London obligations as the sovereign guarantee of the agreement. As part of the agreement, the British and Irish governments committed to holding referendums in Northern Ireland and the Republic on 22 May 1998. The referendum on Northern Ireland is expected to approve the deal reached at the multi-party talks. The Republic of Ireland`s referendum should approve the Anglo-Irish agreement and facilitate the modification of the Irish constitution in accordance with the agreement.
For the first time, the border between North and South will be the EU`s external border. And if the UK leaves not only Europe`s political structures, as the Brexiters have called for, but also its trade structures – the internal market and the customs union – it follows that there are border controls and that the principle of open borders is being violated. But from the beginning, when Boris Johnson was foreign secretary, the May government insisted that the open border remain intact. There was therefore a clear inconsistency between this commitment and the obligation to leave the internal market and the customs union.